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Abstract 
Making accurate judgments is an essential skill in everyday 
life. However, little is known about the basic cognitive skills 
required for accurate judgments. Research on judgment and 
categorization processes suggests that people rely on various 
strategies when making judgments. These strategies differ in 
the cognitive abilities they require. Specifically high working 
memory capacity may benefit rule-based judgments, whereas 
good long-term memory may be crucial for memory-based 
judgments. We investigated this hypothesis following an 
individual differences approach. 177 participants performed 
two judgment tasks that were either best solved by a rule-
based or a memory-based strategy. Additionally, we measured 
working memory capacity and episodic memory with three 
tests. Consistent with our hypothesis structural equation 
modeling showed that working memory capacity predicted 
judgment accuracy in the rule-based task whereas episodic 
memory predicted judgment accuracy in the memory-based 
task. Apparently, different memory abilities are essential for 
successfully adopting different judgment strategies. 
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Long-term memory and working memory are to a varying 
degree engaged in many daily activities. On a shopping trip, 
for example, people need episodic long-term memory to 
remember items on the shopping list. Trying to quickly sum 
up the prices of a shopping basket, however, draws upon 
working memory. Similarly, everyday judgments, such as 
judging the skills of a job candidate or the suitability of an 
apartment, may require both working memory and episodic 
memory. In this paper, we investigate how memory skills 
relate to people’s success in solving judgment tasks. 
Multiple Cue Judgments 
In multiple-cue judgment tasks, people are asked to 
repeatedly estimate a continuous criterion such as the price 
of a shopping basket based on a number of cues, for 
instance the products in the shopping basket. To make such 
judgments, recent research suggests that people rely on two 
kinds of judgment strategies: rule-based and memory-based 
strategies (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; von Helversen 
& Rieskamp, 2008). 
Rule-based strategies assume that people try to explicitly 
abstract the relationship between the cues and the criterion 
and integrate this information in a linear additive way. To 
estimate the price of a shopping basket, for instance, the 
shopper may try to estimate the price of each product and 
add up all prices. Mathematically, this integration process 
can be described with a linear additive model. The criterion 
estimate 
€ 
ˆ c p  of an object p is the weighted sum of the cue 
values xpi:
 
 
€ 
ˆ c p = k + wi ⋅ xpi
i=1
I
∑  (1) 
where wi are the cue weights for each cue i and k is a 
constant intercept.  
In contrast, memory-based strategies assume that people 
judge a new object (the probe) by retrieving previously 
encountered objects (exemplars) from memory. For 
example, when estimating the price of a shopping basket 
people may recall how much they spent the last time they 
went shopping. The more similar a retrieved exemplar 
(previous shopping baskets) is to the probe (current 
shopping basket), the more this exemplar influences the 
probe’s criterion estimate. If a shopper bought the same 
items last time, for instance, he may just recall this price 
from memory to estimate the new prize. 
This judgment strategy is mathematically described with 
an exemplar model (Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003). To 
determine the similarity, first the distance dpj between the 
probe p and exemplar j is calculated. This distance is the 
summed absolute difference of their cue values xpi and xji on 
each cue i, weighted by a sensitivity parameter h. 
€ 
dpj = h xpi − x ji
i=1
I
∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟  (2) 
These distances are then transformed into similarities 
S(p,j) with an exponential decay function (Nosofsky & Zaki, 
1998): 
€ 
S(p, j) = e−d pj  (3) 
To estimate the criterion value 
€ 
ˆ c p , the similarities are 
weighted with their corresponding criterion values cj and 
averaged (Juslin et al., 2003). 
€ 
ˆ c p = S(p, j) ⋅c j
j =1
J
∑ S(p, j)
j =1
J
∑  (4) 
Past research suggests that people shift between rule-
based and memory-based judgment strategies depending on 
task structure (Juslin et al., 2008; von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2008). In linear additive judgment tasks, that is 
in tasks where the criterion can be approximated by a linear 
additive function of the cues, people generally rely on rule-
based strategies. In contrast, in multiplicative judgment 
tasks, where the criterion can be approximated by a 
multiplicative function of the cues, memory-based strategies 
are more frequently used (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & 
Rieskamp, 2013; Juslin et al., 2008). However, little 
attention has been paid to the cognitive abilities these 
strategies draw upon and how individual differences in 
cognitive abilities influence strategy selection and 
performance. 
Memory Processes in Multiple-Cue Judgments 
Theories in judgment and categorization propose that rule-
based and memory-based judgment strategies build on 
different memory abilities. For instance, Ashby and O’Brien 
(2005) suggested that executing simple rule-based 
categorization strategies requires working memory capacity, 
whereas exemplar retrieval involves episodic memory. In a 
similar vein, Juslin et al. (2008) argued that cue abstraction 
could be conceived as a capacity-constrained sequential 
process, whereas memory-based judgment strategies rely on 
a controlled retrieval process. 
Previous research has often studied how working memory 
influences judgment and categorization performance. In line 
with a capacity-constrained abstraction process, cognitive 
load impairs performance in rule-based categorization tasks 
more than performance in implicit information-integration 
tasks (Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). Indeed, cognitive load 
may even induce people to shift from a rule-based to a 
memory-based strategy suggesting that memory-based 
strategies require less cognitive control (Hoffmann et al., 
2013). Yet, some research also suggests that working 
memory may play a crucial role in learning in all judgment 
tasks. Indeed, performance in a range of judgment tasks can 
be predicted by measures of working memory and 
intelligence (Weaver & Stewart, 2012). Similarly, 
Lewandowsky (2011) found that high working memory 
capacity benefitted learning in rule-based as well as 
memory-based categorization tasks. Thus, it is unclear 
whether high working memory capacity only benefits rule 
abstraction processes or whether it benefits performance in 
all kinds of judgment tasks.  
Research relating episodic memory to judgment 
performance is scarce. Exemplar models predict a 
relationship between recognition and categorization and, 
indeed, have successfully modeled both recognition and 
categorization performance (Nosofsky, 1988). Consistent 
with a controlled retrieval process, the instruction to learn 
all exemplars by heart improves performance in a difficult 
memory-based judgment task (Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 
2006). Also, memorization of single exemplars enhances 
recognition of these exemplars in a later recognition test 
(Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995). The importance of episodic 
memory for category learning, however, has been severely 
disputed (Knowlton, 1999), leading to a call for more 
experimental studies (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). Taken 
together, although some evidence suggests that people 
engage in a controlled retrieval process when solving 
memory-based judgment tasks, the role of episodic memory 
in categorization and even more for judgments is still 
unclear.  
The Present Study 
Our study investigates how episodic and working memory 
skills affect judgment performance in rule-based and 
memory-based judgments. We test the hypothesis that 
judgment accuracy is related to working memory capacity 
when people rely on a rule-based judgment strategy. 
Likewise judgment accuracy should be related to episodic 
memory when people adopt a memory-based judgment 
strategy. To test these hypotheses, the participants solved a 
linear as well as a multiplicative judgment task. In addition, 
we measured participants’ working memory and episodic 
memory skills using three different tests. 
Participants 
177 participants (113 female, MAge = 24.1, SDAge = 6.2) 
were recruited at the University of Basel. Participants 
received a participation fee of 20 CHF per hour (approx. 22 
US-$) and an additional bonus in the judgment tasks (M = 
10.3, SD = 2.4). One subject was excluded from the analysis 
because he guessed in the judgment tasks. 
Automated Working Memory Span Tasks 
Working memory span tasks were designed to measure both 
storage and processing of information in working memory 
(Redick et al., 2012). In working memory span tasks, 
participants process one set of stimuli while remembering 
another set of stimuli. For instance, in each trial of the 
operation span task, participants first see a simple equation. 
After they have solved the equation and given the answer, 
they see the first letter that has to be remembered. 
Subsequently, another equation is presented and another 
letter has to be remembered, until the set size (the number of 
presented letters) is reached. Finally, participants are asked 
to recall the letters in the order of their appearance. Trials 
with different set sizes are randomly interspersed, with each 
set size repeated three times. All span tasks were taken from 
Unsworth et al. (2009) and translated to German. 
Reading Span In the reading span participants judged the 
plausibility of a sentence while remembering letters. Set size 
varied from 3 to 7. 
Operation Span Participants were asked to solve 
mathematical equations while remembering letters. Set size 
varied from 3 to 7. 
Symmetry Span Participants judged the symmetry of a 
chessboard picture while remembering the position of 
squares in 4 x 4 matrix. Set size varied from 2 to 5. 
Episodic Memory Tasks 
We measured episodic memory with three different tasks: a 
free recall task with pictures, a cued recall task with 
numbers, and a recognition test of verbs. 
Picture Free Recall We selected 20 pictures from a picture 
database (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004) that had high ratings 
on imagery and concreteness. Each picture was presented 
for 3 s on the screen and participants were asked to 
remember them. After a retention interval of 2 minutes 
participants recalled the pictures.  
Cued Number Recall We assessed cued number recall with 
a computerized version of the Cued Number Recall task 
from the BIS 4 (Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997). 15 pairs of 
a two- and a three-digit number were presented for 10 s each 
on the screen. After a retention interval of 2 minutes 
participants saw the cued number pair as well as four three-
digit distractors and had to indicate which three-digit 
number was initially presented together with the two-digit 
number. 
Verb Recognition We selected 40 verbs with 5 to 7 letters 
from the Hager and Hasselhorn database (1994) rated high 
on imagery and concreteness. Participants learned half of 
the verbs for 3 s each. After a retention interval of 2 minutes 
participants indicated whether they recognized the 40 verbs 
from the learning phase by classifying them as old or new. 
Judgment Tasks 
Participants solved both a linear and a multiplicative 
judgment task. In the linear judgment task, we expected 
participants to use a rule-based strategy; that is, their 
judgments should be well described by a linear regression 
model. In contrast, in the multiplicative judgment task, 
participants should rely on a memory-based strategy (Juslin 
et al., 2008). 
In the linear judgment task, the criterion y was a linear, 
additive function of the cues and could thus be perfectly 
predicted by a rule-based strategy: 
y = 4 c1 + 3 c2 + 2 c3 + c4 (5) 
where c1 reflects the most important cue according to its cue 
weight. Each cue value varied between 0 and 5. 
In the multiplicative judgment task the function 
generating the criterion y included a multiplicative 
combination of the cues: 
€ 
y = 4 c1 + 3c2 + 2c3 +c4 + 2c1c2c3 + c2c3c4( ) 8.5 (6) 
Because of the interacting cues, abstracting linear additive 
rules does not help solve the task. Therefore, people should 
switch to exemplar-based strategies and store the objects 
and the associated criterion values in exemplar memory 
(Juslin et al., 2008). 
We used two different cover stories for the linear and the 
multiplicative multiple-cue judgment task. In the linear 
judgment task, participants judged how well a comic figure 
performed in a game on a scale from 0 to 50. In the 
multiplicative judgment task, participants estimated how 
toxic a bug was on a scale from 0 to 50. The stimuli for the 
two cover stories consisted of pictures of either bugs or 
comic figures. These bugs and comic figures varied on four 
different continuous cues. The bugs varied on the length of 
their legs, their antennae, and their wings and the number of 
points on their back. The comic figures had different sizes 
of their ears and their nose, a different number of hairs and 
stripes on their shirt. These visual features were randomly 
assigned to the cues. 
Both tasks consisted of a training phase and a test phase. 
During the training phase, participants learned to estimate 
the criterion values for 25 exemplars. In each trial, 
participants first saw a picture of a bug or a comic figure 
and were asked to estimate its criterion value. Afterwards 
they received feedback about the correct value, their own 
estimate and the points they earned. The training phase 
ended after 10 blocks. In the subsequent test phase, 
participants judged 15 new probes four times, but did not 
receive any performance feedback. 
To motivate participants to reach a high performance, 
participants could earn points in every trial. The number of 
points they earned was a truncated quadratic function of the 
deviation of their judgment j from the criterion y: 
€ 
Points = 20− ( j − y)2 7.625  (7) 
At the end of the judgment tasks, the points earned were 
converted to a monetary bonus (1500 points = 1 CHF). In 
addition, participants earned a bonus of 3 CHF if they 
reached 80% of the points in the last training block. 
Procedure 
Participants solved all tasks on one day with half an hour 
break between the two sessions. The tasks were presented in 
the same order to each participant. In the first session, 
participants began with the linear judgment task, moved on 
to the operation span, solved the verb recognition and the 
picture free recall task, and finally completed the symmetry 
span. The second session started with the multiplicative 
judgment task. Afterwards, participants completed the 
reading span and finally the cued number recall task. 
Results 
Task Performance 
We first analyzed participants’ average performance in the 
memory and the judgment tasks (see Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics). In the working memory tasks, we used the partial 
credit score, the sum of items recalled in the correct 
position, as the dependent variable (Conway et al., 2005). If 
a participant recalled all items correctly, he achieved a score 
of 75 in the operation span and the reading span and a score 
of 42 in the symmetry span. Overall, participants recalled 
more items in the operation and the reading span than in the 
symmetry span, replicating normative data (Redick et al., 
2012). In the episodic memory tasks, we used the 
percentage of correctly recalled items as the dependent 
variable. On average, participants remembered a higher 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the memory and the 
judgment tasks. 
Task M SD Skew Kurt 
Operation Span 57.7 12.3 -1.2 1.7 
Reading Span 57.1 12.2 -1.8 2.3 
Symmetry Span 29.6 7.4 -0.6 0.1 
Recognition (% recalled) .87 .09 -0.7 0.5 
Cued Recall (% recalled) .42 .19 0.2 -0.2 
Free Recall (% recalled) .46 .17 0.1 -.01 
Linear Judgment     
  Last training block 6.0 2.2 0.9 1.9 
  Test (Mean) 5.4 1.8 0.7 0.8 
Multiplicative Judgment     
  Last training block 5.2 1.8 0.7 0.6 
  Test (Mean) 5.0 1.8 1.0 0.8 
Note: Skew = Skewness; Kurt = Kurtosis 
 
percentage of items correctly in the recognition task than in 
the cued recall or the free recall task. 
Learning performance in the judgment tasks was 
measured with the root mean squared deviation (RMSD) 
between participants’ judgments and the correct criterion in 
the last training block. The learning performance showed 
that on average participants learned the judgment tasks quite 
well. However, the multiplicative judgment task was learned 
more easily than the linear judgment task. Could 
participants generalize this good performance to judgments 
for new items in the test phase? We measured judgment 
performance in the test phase as the RMSD between the 
correct criterion and participants’ mean judgments; that is, 
the judgment for each probe averaged over the four 
presentations in the test phase. Performance for new items 
in the test phase was comparable to performance in the 
training phase indicating that participants successfully 
generalized their performance to new items. 
To determine which judgment strategy described 
participants’ judgments best, we fitted a linear regression 
model (see equation 1) and an exemplar model (see 
equations 2-4) to participants’ judgments in the last three 
training blocks and predicted participants’ mean judgments 
in the test phase (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). We 
compared those models to a baseline model that simply 
estimated participants’ mean judgment. Participants were 
classified as following the strategy that led to the smallest 
RMSD between model predictions and participants’ mean 
judgments in the test phase. As shown in Figure 1 the 
judgment process of the participants was highly task 
sensitive: In the linear judgment task most participants were 
best described by a linear model, whereas in the 
multiplicative judgment task, most participants were best 
described by an exemplar model, χ2(2) = 95.3, p < .001. 
Measurement Models 
To understand which memory abilities underlie human 
judgment processes we followed a structural equation  
 
Figure 1. Strategy classification of participants in the linear 
and the multiplicative judgment task. 
modeling approach. Structural equation modeling allows 
detecting relationships between latent constructs while 
correcting for the distinct variance of the measures (for a 
review see Tomarken & Waller, 2005). 
We first estimated two separate measurement models for 
memory and judgment abilities. These models were later 
combined into one structural model. All models were 
estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator with 
robust standard errors (MLR) because descriptive data 
indicated some deviations from multivariate normality. The 
reported χ2 difference tests were performed using the 
Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2 values (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). 
Measurement Models for Memory Abilities To measure 
memory abilities, we hypothesized that episodic memory 
and working memory capacity can be conceived of as two 
separate latent constructs that may be correlated (Brewer & 
Unsworth, 2012). We first fitted a two-factor latent variable 
model to the memory data assuming no correlation between 
working memory and episodic memory. All working 
memory span tasks loaded on one latent factor, while all 
episodic memory tasks loaded on a second latent factor. 
Because the residual variance of the manifest variable 
recognition was estimated to be negative, we fixed it to 0. 
This model fitted reasonably well, χ2(10) = 16.11, p = .10, 
CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .08. Allowing working 
memory capacity and episodic memory to correlate did not 
significantly improve model fit, χ2(9) = 14.85, p = .10, CFI 
= .95, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .06. Finally, a one-factor 
model assuming a correlation of 1 between episodic 
memory and working memory capacity fitted worse than the 
two-factor model, χ2(10) = 128.2, p < .001, CFI = .01, 
RMSEA = .26, SRMR = .16. In sum, memory abilities in 
our study were best described by assuming two separate, 
uncorrelated latent constructs for working memory and 
episodic memory. 
Measurement Models for Judgment Abilities To find out 
whether performance depends on the judgment task, we 
fitted three different measurement models for judgment 
abilities to judgment performance in the four test blocks of 
the linear and the multiplicative judgment task. We first 
estimated a two-factor latent variable model assuming no
77%
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7%
Linear task
33%
66%
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Multiplicative task
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Figure 2: Structural equation model relating working memory capacity and episodic memory to judgment 
performance in the test phase. All loadings and correlations are standardized. 
 
correlation between the factors. One factor predicted 
judgment performance in the linear judgment task, the 
second factor predicted judgment performance in the 
multiplicative judgment task. This model did not describe 
the judgment data well, χ2(20) = 38.54, p < .01, CFI = .975, 
RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .11. Allowing a correlation 
between the judgment factors improved model fit, χ2(19) = 
28.24, p = .08, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .03. 
Finally, we estimated a one-factor model assuming a 
correlation of 1 between judgment performance in the linear 
and the multiplicative task. This one-factor model could not 
account for the judgment data, χ2(20) = 362.14, p < .001, 
CFI = .54, RMSEA = .31, SRMR = .22. In sum, a two-
factor model with correlated factors captured performance 
variations within the judgment tasks best. This suggests that 
although performance in rule-based and memory-based 
judgment tasks is correlated, distinct processes may account 
for performance differences between the tasks. 
Linking Memory Skills to Judgment Performance 
Next, we investigated the link between memory abilities and 
judgment performance. Based on our prediction, we 
estimated a structural model (depicted in Figure 2) relating 
working memory capacity to judgment performance in the 
linear task and episodic memory to judgment performance 
in the multiplicative task. This model provided a good fit to 
the data, χ2(75) = 89.93, p = .12, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .03, 
SRMR = .08. Allowing a correlation between working 
memory capacity and judgment performance in 
multiplicative tasks and a correlation between episodic 
memory and judgment performance in linear tasks did not 
significantly improve the fit of the structural model, χ2(73) 
= 85.27, p = .15, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .06. 
Also, a structural model assuming that memory abilities do 
not predict judgment abilities could not account for the data, 
χ2(77) = 107.48, p = .01, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .05, SRMR 
= .10. Indeed, setting the weight from working memory to 
linear task performance to 0 decreased model fit, Δχ2(1) = 
4.10, p = .04. Likewise, setting the weight from episodic 
memory to multiplicative task performance to 0 decreased 
model fit, Δχ2(1) = 12.67, p < .001. Thus, while judgment 
accuracy in rule-based tasks was predicted by working 
memory capacity, judgment accuracy in memory-based 
tasks was predicted by episodic memory. 
Discussion 
Our study sheds light on which memory abilities people rely 
when making judgments, a topic that has received little 
attention in the literature. As the first study linking memory 
abilities to performance in judgment tasks, we found that 
working memory capacity predicted judgment accuracy in a 
linear task, whereas episodic memory predicted judgment 
accuracy in a multiplicative task. Furthermore, participants 
relied on a rule-based strategy in the linear task and a 
memory-based strategy in the multiplicative task. In line 
with theories of judgment and categorization (Ashby & 
O’Brien, 2005; Juslin et al., 2008) this suggests that the two 
strategies draw upon different memory abilities.  
Our results suggest that working memory capacity only 
predicted judgment performance in rule-based judgment 
tasks. This result seems to contradict research linking 
working memory capacity to performance in rule-based and 
memory-based categorization tasks (Lewandowsky, 2011). 
One reason for these diverging results may be that our study 
focused on the differences between judgment tasks, namely 
the covariance that was not explained by a common 
judgment factor. Yet, Lewandowsky concentrated on the 
similarities among categorization tasks. Another reason for 
these diverging results may be that our study focused on the 
generalization to new items instead of the learning process. 
Indeed, in Lewandowsky’s study a learning parameter was 
strongly related to working memory capacity. Thus, while 
learning to apply a rule-based or a memory-based judgment 
strategy may require working memory capacity, only the 
correct execution of a rule-based judgment strategy may 
draw upon working memory capacity. Executing a memory-
based judgment strategy may instead involve episodic 
memory skills. 
Few studies have examined the link between episodic 
memory and judgment abilities. Our study clearly shows 
that episodic memory is related to performance in memory-
based judgments. This result highlights the importance of 
episodic memory for judgments and resonates well with 
theories suggesting that exemplars are stored and 
deliberatively retrieved from long-term memory (Juslin et 
al., 2008). It is also in line with research arguing for 
exemplar processes in categorization (Nosofsky & Zaki, 
1998). Beyond that, our results highlight that a multitude of 
cognitive skills, not only working memory, is involved 
when people make judgments. Shifting the focus to long-
term memory may open up new research questions and 
applications. For instance, memory-based judgment 
strategies may be more vulnerable to forgetting and 
interference. Knowledge about storage and retrieval 
processes in judgment may thus help improving judgments 
ranging from simple daily judgments such as estimating the 
price of a shopping basket to professional judgments such as 
judging the quality of a job candidate. 
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